Teacher hiring decisions: How do governments react to an exogenous redistribution of education funds?
ARTICLE
Tassia Cruz
Economics of Education Review Volume 67, Number 1, ISSN 0272-7757 Publisher: Elsevier Ltd
Abstract
This paper examines the teacher hiring decisions of Brazilian local governments in response to an education funding reform, called FUNDEF. The reform redistributed funding across municipalities and determined a minimum spending on teachers. While several papers have already examined the overall effect of the FUNDEF reform, this is the first analysis of the effects of the municipalities’ relative positions after the redistribution on hiring decisions. Using a simulated difference-in-differences model, I find that FUNDEF only led to salary increases in municipalities that benefited from the redistribution. Contrary to its initial goal, municipalities harmed by the redistribution responded by increasing hiring. Additionally, employing a simulated instrumental-variable model, I find that the amount received in FUNDEF transfers did not lead to pay increases. Models of government-union interaction are used to explain these results, suggesting that the bargaining power is the main driver of teacher pay.
Citation
Cruz, T. (2018). Teacher hiring decisions: How do governments react to an exogenous redistribution of education funds?. Economics of Education Review, 67(1), 58-81. Elsevier Ltd. Retrieved March 19, 2024 from https://www.learntechlib.org/p/206496/.
This record was imported from Economics of Education Review on March 1, 2019. Economics of Education Review is a publication of Elsevier.
Full text is availabe on Science Direct: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2018.09.002Keywords
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