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Teacher behavior under performance pay incentives
ARTICLE

Economics of Education Review Volume 37, Number 1, ISSN 0272-7757 Publisher: Elsevier Ltd

Abstract

Over the last decade many districts implemented performance pay incentives to reward teachers for improving student achievement. Economic theory suggests that these programs could alter teacher work effort, cooperation, and retention. Because teachers can choose to work in a performance pay district that has characteristics correlated with teacher behavior, I use the distance between a teacher's undergraduate institution and the nearest performance pay district as an instrumental variable. Using data from the 2003 and 2007 waves of the Schools and Staffing Survey, I find that teachers respond to performance pay incentives by working fewer hours per week. Performance pay also decreases participation in unpaid cooperative school activities, while there is suggestive evidence that teacher turnover decreases. The treatment effects are heterogeneous; male teachers respond more positively than female teachers. In Florida, which restricts state performance pay funding to individual teachers, I find that work effort and teacher turnover increase.

Citation

Jones, M.D. (2013). Teacher behavior under performance pay incentives. Economics of Education Review, 37(1), 148-164. Elsevier Ltd. Retrieved November 13, 2019 from .

This record was imported from Economics of Education Review on March 1, 2019. Economics of Education Review is a publication of Elsevier.

Full text is availabe on Science Direct: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2013.09.005

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